Causal Pluralism: Agent Causation Without the Panicky Metaphysics

Synthese (2023)

In this paper, I argue that the dichotomy between event- and agent-causalists is a false one. I do this by introducing a new view called Causal Pluralism, which maintains that free will is compatible with both event and substance causation. Additionally, I argue that agent-causalists have good reason to adopt Causal Pluralism, and also that the view has interesting implications for the free will dialectic.

Agent Causation and Motivating Reasons 

(Draft Available Upon Request)

This paper examines the problem of how to integrate motivating reasons into a picture of agent causation, where a motivating reason is a reason that we act on or for. More specifically,  I canvass a number of theoretical options for the agent-causalist—developing novel options along the way—but ultimately argue that each are problematic. I conclude that the most promising option for the agent-causalist is to take the relation of acting on a reason as a primitive and basic feature in her overall theory.

Agents, Laws, and Events: Reconsidering Pereboom's Wild Coincidence Objection 

(Draft Available Upon Request)

According to Derk Pereboom’s Wild Coincidence Objection, our current empirical evidence is in conflict with agent causation. Because our empirical evidence shows that the world is wholly governed by physical laws, we can explain any purportedly free action using our physical laws–thus undermining any explanation put forth by the agent-causalist. In this paper, I argue that, while more forceful than previous authors have recognized, the objection is unpersuasive. More specifically, I argue that the objection relies on an oversimplified picture of our current empirical knowledge.

Portilla and the Problem of Nepantla

The concept of nepantla has played a central role in the development of Mexican philosophical thought, as seen in thinkers such as Emilio Uranga and Gloria Anzaldúa. Nepantla is a Nahuatl term that is often translated as "in-between-ness." Roughly understood, nepantla is the state of being caught between different identities—different packages of norms, meanings, and values. This paper focuses on the 20th century Mexican philosopher, Jorge Portilla. While Portilla never explicitly discusses the idea of nepantla, I argue that an account of nepantla can nontheless be extracted from his thinking. Doing so opens up a new way of conceiving of the problem of nepantla. Rather than seeing nepantla as primarily an inner-psychic problem, this alternative picture from Portilla suggests that nepantla is a problem that is primarily grounded in the dysfunctioning of one's society. 

A Puzzle for Reasons Responsive Accounts of Moral Responsibility

(Draft Available Upon Request)

In recent years, reasons-responsive accounts of moral responsibility have gained significant traction. One reason for this is that these theorists have developed sophisticated tools for dealing with a wide array of everyday cases in which various excuses and exemptions apply. This paper raises a puzzle for one dominant strand of reasons-responsive accounts, namely, those that ground reasons-responsiveness in various kind of counterfactuals. I provide various reasons for thinking that the relevant counterfactuals can't be true under conditions of indeterminism. In light of this, I argue that these reasons-responsive theorists must either commit to the position moral responsibility requires determinism, or else give up the counterfactual analysis of reasons-responsiveness. I suggest that this gives us reason to seek a form of reasons-responsive that is thoroughly non-modal.